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Can P2P Replace Direct Download
for Content Distribution?
Abstract
While peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing is a powerful and
cost-effective content distribution model, most paid-for
digital-content providers (CPs) rely on direct download
to deliver their content. CPs such as Apple iTunes that
command a large base of paying users are hesitant to
use a P2P model that could easily degrade their user
base into yet another free file-sharing community.
We present TP2, a system that makes P2P file shar-
ing a viable delivery mechanism for paid digital content
by providing the same security properties as the cur-
rently used direct-download model. TP2 introduces the
novel notion of trusted auditors (TAs) – P2P peers that
are controlled by the system operator. TAs monitor
the behavior of other peers and help detect and prevent
formation of illegal file-sharing clusters among the CP’s
user base. TAs both complement and exploit the strong
authentication and authorization mechanisms that are
used in TP2 to control access to content. It is impor-
tant to note that TP2 does not attempt to solve the
out-of-band file-sharing or DRM problems, which also
exist in the direct-download systems currently in use.
We analyze TP2 by modeling it as a novel game be-
tween misbehaving users who try to form unauthorized
file-sharing clusters and TAs who curb the growth of
such clusters. Our analysis shows that a small fraction
of TAs is sufficient to protect the P2P system against
unauthorized file sharing. In a system with as many
as 60% of misbehaving users, even a small fraction of
TAs can detect 99% of unauthorized cluster formation.
We developed a simple economic model to show that
even with such a large fraction of malicious nodes, TP2
can improve CP’s profits (which could translate to user
savings) by 62 to 122%, even while assuming conser-
vative estimates of content and bandwidth costs. We
implemented TP2 as a layer on top of BitTorrent and
demonstrated experimentally using PlanetLab that our
system provides trusted P2P file sharing with negligible
performance overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of our work is to make peer-to-peer (P2P)
file sharing a viable delivery mechanism for paid dig-
ital content by providing the same security properties
as the currently used direct-download model. P2P file
sharing is a powerful and cost-effective content distribu-
tion model due to its ability to leverage the participat-
ing users’ uplink bandwidth. Popular examples include
BitTorrent [6], Napster [20] and Kazaa [15]). However,
online paid-content providers (CPs) typically rely on di-
rect download to distribute the paid content. For exam-
ple, Apple iTunes [14], Amazon [3] and Sony distribute
content either directly from their website or via con-
tracted content delivery networks (CDNs) such as Aka-
mai [2]. These CPs command a large base of paying
users [18], and could directly benefit by using a P2P
content distribution model, which would significantly
reduce their infrastructure requirements and costs (or
CDN fees), increasing profits and/or passing savings on
to customers in the form of lower prices. However, CPs
are hesitant to rely on a P2P model for content distribu-
tion, as it can easily deteriorate into a free file-sharing
community similar to Xbox-sky [29] and Red Skunk
Tracker [23]): since P2P users communicate with one
another directly during file distribution, it is very easy
for them to form clusters for free and illegal exchange of
their past and future downloads from these CPs, using
the exact same protocols and, largely, software.
If CPs are to successfully adopt a P2P distribution
model, they need a system that does not allow their
paying user base to deteriorate into yet another free file-
sharing community, thereby eroding the CPs’ profits.
Designing such a system is challenging because in P2P
systems, users communicate directly with one another
and thus the user base is a fertile ground for prolifera-
tion of illegal file-sharing. First, the user base becomes
quickly known to parties that want to promote unautho-
rized sharing. Second, the direct communication makes
it easy for a few misbehaving users to distribute a mod-
ified or “malicious” software client quickly even to well-
meaning users. The modified software automatically
connects the users out-of-band and helps them share
their libraries. Out-of-band communication and distri-
bution of content by misbehaving users (e.g., purchasing
a movie on iTunes and making it available for free in
Gnutella) is an equal threat for both the direct-download
and P2P distribution cases, and our work is not directed
against that scenario. We are motivated by the fact that,
despite the wide availability of illegal file-sharing fo-
rums, commercially viable direct-download systems ex-
ist: Apple iTunes alone maintains tens of millions of
paying users [18]. Our goal is to make P2P distribution
as secure as the direct-download case. Because P2P is
an inherently more efficient system, we will reduce the
costs for both the users and the CP.
We propose TP2, a system that meets the challenge
of adopting the P2P model without the proliferation of
unauthorized sharing. TP2 introduces the technique of
“trusted auditing” that covertly monitors the behavior
of P2P users and detects any sign of sharing-clusters for-
mation, stops cluster-formation in its tracks, and thus
protects the CP’s profits.
TP2 allows a CP to take advantage of the cost-effective
distribution capabilities of a decentralized P2P approach,
while allowing the CP to maintain the same “trust” in
its user behavior as with a direct download system. We
view TP2 as a layer that adds security and monitor-
ing capabilities to a generic underlying P2P distribu-
tion mechanism. First, TP2 adds strong authentication
and authorization to a P2P system such that users can
only download content after payment or other autho-
rization. Second, it introduces the notion of trusted
auditors (TAs), which are software agents nodes con-
trolled by the CP that are posing as normal P2P nodes
(users). Their purpose is to detect any type of unau-
thorized activity including deviations from the normal
protocol implementation, port probing, malformed mes-
sages, attempts by unauthorized nodes to access con-
tent without proper credentials, and any effort to cre-
ate an out-of-band communication with another node
that is participating in the system. The detection of
such forms of behavior is a key ingredient in prevent-
ing formation of out-of-band file-sharing clusters. When
TAs detect misbehavior, a variety of countermeasures
may be taken. In the simplest case, offending peers are
banned from the P2P system to a direct download sys-
tem where the CP does not need to worry about the
peers exploiting the P2P file-sharing infrastructure.
TP2 provides the following key properties:
Content Protection. TP2 enforces strong authenti-
cation and authorization for all P2P communications,
which inhibits unauthorized nodes from connecting to
other compliant P2P participants. This property is en-
forced via encryption and management of signed autho-
rization certificates.
Inherent Trust. TAs restrict the ability of malicious
nodes to discover other malicious nodes for illegal file
sharing and trading. As a result, the CP can have some
guarantees that the P2P system will not be exploited by
malicious nodes. Both with P2P and direct download, a
user can share the content she downloads illegally in an
out-of-band forum. However, with the use of strong au-
thentication and TAs, TP2 protects the CP’s user base
itself from becoming a forum of free content downloads
or information scavenging for future illegal trading. We
demonstrate analytically how the probability of cluster
formation in TP2 is significantly reduced.
Bandwidth Savings. Our system leverages P2P band-
width for file downloads, providing tremendous scalable
bandwidth and infrastructure savings. While the CP
must provision bandwidth for the TAs, and therefore
incur certain operational costs, we show that TAs con-
stitute only a small fraction of the overall P2P network
and thus the total bandwidth savings remain significant.
The contributions of our work are as follows:
• We introduce a novel technique of trusted auditors
as a controlled and inexpensive way to automat-
ically monitor and detect misbehavior in a P2P
system.
• We analyze TP2 by modeling it as a novel game
between malicious users who try to form free file-
sharing clusters and TAs who curb the growth of
such clusters. Our analysis shows that even a
small fraction of TAs is sufficient to protect the
P2P system against unauthorized file sharing. Even
assuming that 60% of the P2P users in the sys-
tem are attempting to form unauthorized clusters
with other users, and 10 times as many misbe-
having users as TAs, TP2 can detect 99% of the
misbehaving users and can prevent 80% of such
users from forming even small clusters. Using a
simple economic model, we further show that TP2
provides a more cost-effective content distribution
solution, resulting in higher profits for a CP even
in the presence of a large percentage of malicious
users. Even assuming that 60% of the P2P users
in the system are attempting to form unautho-
rized clusters, TP2 achieves between 62 and 122%
higher profit per download than a direct download
system assuming conservative profit numbers and
bandwidth costs.
• Finally, we implement TP2 security elements on
top of BitTorrent to demonstrate that our system
can provide its functionality in an existing, widely-
used P2P system with only modest modifications.
Our experimental results on PlanetLab show that
TP2 can provide its trusted content distribution
functionality while imposing negligible performance
overhead.
2. RELATEDWORK
As broadband Internet access becomes more preva-
lent, digital content stores such as Apple Itunes and
Amazon have begun to distribute richer digital content
over the Internet, such as TV series episodes and full-
length movies. Since each download requires signifi-
cant bandwidth, these stores typically contract Content
Delivery Networks (CDNs) to distribute their content.
Commercial CDNs include Akamai [2], Limelight [17]
and VitalStream [28]. CDNs typically operate thou-
sands of servers deployed in various networks and ISPs.
In addition to offering vast amount of scalable band-
width, CDNs can enforce appropriate security measures
on behalf of a digital store, such as authorization of
customers and encryption of served content. However,
the price paid to CDNs for their services is quite high.
Market research [1] suggests that digital media vendors
spend 20% of their revenue on infrastructure costs for
serving content. While free academic alternative CDNs
such as Coral [12] and CoDeeN [13] exist, these sys-
tems are typically limited in their deployment and the
amount of bandwidth they are allowed to use.
An alternative powerful distribution model is Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) systems such as BitTorrent [6], Napster
[20] and Kazaa [15]) among others. No extra contracted
bandwidth is required as users leverage one another’s
upload links to “share” content. BitTorrent is perhaps
the most popular of these systems, and many analytical
works [31, 11, 16, 10] have shown the high efficiency and
scalability characteristics of BitTorrent. Unfortunately,
it is very difficult to implement proper authentication
and authorization in such P2P systems to distribute
copyrighted or paid content only to intended recipients.
In fact, such systems typically implement a searchable
directory of available content including copyrighted ma-
terial. For this very reason, distributors of paid content
shy away from P2P distribution models.
Various companies have attempted to address this
problem with P2P systems. MoveDigital [19] imple-
ments a gateway in front of a P2P system to allow only
authorized users access. However, once inside, users can
leverage the system for further illegal sharing without
limitations. For example, if a user can learn the IP ad-
dresses of other users inside the system, she can start
sharing content with those users directly for free, by-
passing the up-front payment. Moreover, users might
choose to participate in the P2P system and pay to
download files to gain knowledge about other partici-
pants that have similar interests. Then, they can easily
form another, private P2P community, a darknet [5],
for free future exchange of similar content.
Another approach is Avalanche [7], which uses net-
work coding to encode exchanged blocks and relies on
a proprietary protocol to attempt to prevent malicious
use through security by obfuscation. However, if the
system is hacked such that malicious nodes can partici-
pate in the system, there are no effective mechanisms to
prevent its exploitation for free file sharing. In contrast,
TP2 is designed explicitly to guard against such free file
sharing using an open system architecture that is resis-
tant to exploitation even in the presence of malicious
nodes. TAs used in TP2 are owned and managed by
the content provider, and are unlike reputation-based
systems [30] where users simply rate each other such
that the resulting ratings may not be trustworthy.
An additional problem for efficient P2P distribution
of content is “free-riding” by users who do not upload to
their neighbors [24]. This problem can be partially ad-
dressed by BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat mechanism [4] which
was found to be fairly robust in [21]. Additional solu-
tions that consider incentives in P2P systems have also
been proposed [27][25]. We believe, that our technique
of using TAs could also be used to solve this problem.
By monitoring the fairness of user file-sharing behavior
from multiple TAs the system can make a decision to
move a user who is not contributing to its neighbors to
a slower direct download system. We leave this idea as
an item for future work and focus here on using TAs to
prevent illegal cluster formation.
3. ARCHITECTURE
The TP2 architecture is designed as an additional
layer for common P2P systems. This layer consists of
components that enforce stronger security and trust in
the P2P system: the authenticator service and trusted
auditors. While TP2 layer can be applied to virtually
any common P2P system, we use BitTorrent as the un-
derlying P2P system as a proof of concept.We selected
BitTorrent given its popularity, open implementation,
and its very efficient file-swarming mechanism where
users share individual blocks of a given file.
The goal of Bittorrent is to distribute a file as fast
as possible to all connected peers. BitTorrent splits the
file (such as a digital movie) into a number of chunks.
Participating peers exchange individual chunks of the
file using a file swarming approach. The swarming al-
gorithm is fully distributed and nodes use it to decide
from which peers they are going to request their missing
chunks. In addition, in each file-sharing instance there
are one or more Seeds present. Seeds are peers that
have all the chunks of the given file. The party that
advertises the content typically initializes one or more
Seeds with the full content of the file. A file-sharing
instance also contains a Tracker that tracks all partic-
ipating peers. A peer joins the system by contacting
the Tracker. It receives a set of usually up to 50 IP
addresses of other participating Peers. The Peer then
exchanges chunks of the file with the other Peers and
periodically updates its progress to the Tracker via an-
nounce messages.
3.1 System Overview and Usage
When the user decides to purchase content for the
Figure 1: To purchase a file, the user logs in on the
portal, pays, obtains a signed credential and contacts
the tracker for the purchased file.
Figure 2: Users authenticate one another and re-
quest file pieces. A fraction of trusted auditors is
mixed in among the file-sharing peers.
first time, she registers at the content provider’s por-
tal. She picks a username and a password and en-
ters her payment information (i.e., credit card number).
She then downloads a software client that allows her
to browse for files, purchase content and perform P2P
downloads. For each subsequent purchase from the con-
tent provider (CP) at the CP’s portal, she is authorized
to perform the download by receiving a verifiable token
(signed credential). The authenticator also generates
credentials for the user to be used for secure commu-
nication during its download session. (We occasionally
refer to the file-sharing instance as a download session.)
We describe these parameters in Section 3.2.
The user is then directed to a tracker that manages a
file-sharing instance for the purchased file. The tracker
validates that the user is authorized to perform the
download by verifying her credentials. The user’s in-
teraction with the authenticator and the tracker is de-
picted in Figures 1 and 2. As in BitTorrent, the tracker
assigns a set of other clients or peers to the new client.
The client shares pieces of the purchased file with her as-
signed peers using BitTorrent’s file-swarming approach.
TP2 differs significantly from BitTorrent in the assign-
ment of the peers. The TP2 tracker ensures that a
certain fraction of the peers that it assigns are trusted
auditors (TAs), as shown in Figure 2. TAs are special
peers who, in addition to participating in a download
session, detect malicious communication. The detected
malicious peers are identified and “banished” from the
system as described in Section 3.3.
To summarize, the main distinctions between the TP2-
augmented system and vanilla BitTorrent are:
• Whereas in BitTorrent a user contacts a tracker di-
rectly, in TP2 a user enters the system through the au-
thenticator service. The authenticator hands out verifi-
able tokens and parameters for secure communication.
• The client and the tracker software is modified to en-
force strong authentication, authorization checking and
encryption in all point-to-point communications.
• In its assignments of peers in each download session,
the TP2 tracker includes a fraction of TAs. The trusted
auditors are owned and managed by the CP, and their
identity is known to the tracker but not to the regular
clients. The exact number of TAs is a parameter in
the system that we discuss as part of our analysis in
Section 4.
• TAs implement the same protocols as regular P2P
clients, but also detect any malicious communication
and “ban” malicious users from the P2P system as will
be described further in the paper.
We now describe the new components added by TP2,
and the threats that they help address.
3.2 Authorization
We now describe the authenticator and other modules
which enforce strong authorization and authentication.
When a user purchases the content at the CP’s por-
tal, their credit card is charged the cost of the content.
An entry is also entered in the CP’s database that au-
thorizes the user with the given username to download
the content. At that point the authenticator that runs
on the CP’s portal generates authorization credentials
for the user and sends them to the user over a secure
connection (using SSL).
Authorization Credentials The authorization cre-
dentials given to the user include a temporary pub-
lic/private key pair and a signed credential (akin to
a public-key certificate) signed by the authenticator,
whose public key is implicitly trusted by all partici-
pating users (i.e., it is distributed along with the soft-
ware, or is otherwise well known). More specifically,
we use public-key-signed policy statements (similar in
form to public-key certificates [8]) issued by the content
provider as the basis for authorization in our system.
These credentials are supplied to authorized users after
a purchase is made, and can be used as proof to both
the Tracker and the other participants in a P2P down-
load session. In total, the credential includes a Session
ID that identifies the user’s download session, an expi-
ration time, the user’s IP address and public key, and
an Instance ID (a unique identifier of the file-sharing
instance managed by the Tracker).
Verification by Tracker Following the previous step,
the user establishes an encrypted TCP connection to
the Tracker using the Tracker’s public key and sends
its certificate. The Tracker validates the digital signa-
ture on the certificate against the authenticator’s public
key, confirms that the user’s IP matches the one in the
certificate, and that the certificate has not expired and
that the Instance ID refers to a valid download instance.
If all the parameters are confirmed, the Tracker as-
signs and sends a list of other peers to the new user,
along with a new credential that lets the new user con-
tact other nodes of the same session.
Peer Verification When establishing communication,
nodes verify their peers using the tracker-issued cre-
dentials: the signature, IP address, public/private key
binding, expiration, and instance ID. After verification,
they negotiate a symmetric session key for their en-
crypted TCP connection using their public/private keys.
3.3 Trusted Auditors
In each download session, the system trackers include
some TAs. The TAs imitate other peers through their
participation in the P2P file exchange. In addition they
passively and actively detect malicious nodes that ei-
ther try to share content illegally or try to establish
communication channels with other nodes for future il-
legal sharing. The discovered nodes are then banished
to an isolated direct-download system where they can
no longer discover other malicious nodes. As a deter-
rent, the banished nodes may also be charged a penalty
of the bandwidth cost on their future downloads. Al-
ternatively they may be warned with a temporary fine
or threatened with legal action. The details depend on
the policy of the CP and how they want to leverage the
detection mechanism. We discuss some alternatives in
Section 4.4.3. While TAs will reduce the loss (and thus
increase profit) of the CP, they also incur a cost (e.g.,
in terms of the bandwidth they consume, which the CP
has to pay for). This is why the fraction of the TAs in
a session must remain small.
Detecting Malicious Nodes As we describe in Sec-
tion 3.4, malicious nodes may attempt to exploit the
P2P system to either download content without proper
authorization from the known IPs or to initiate a non-
protocol connection with other IPs in the hope of form-
ing an illegal cluster for future file-sharing. Strictly
speaking, the TAs attempt to detect any communica-
tion that deviates from accepted TP2 protocols with the
intent of establishing a covert trading channel. We can
steer clear of false positives by following the full protocol
that the malicious users use to exchange unpaid content
and incriminate them with evidence of such transaction.
Behavior that might lead to the establishment of covert
channels include unauthorized or an unencrypted con-
nections, connections to a non-protocol port and a con-
nections to a proper port that is not formatted accord-
ing to protocol. Again, all such activity can be moni-
tored and reproduced by the TAs only when it leads to
actual illegal exchange of content.
Malicious users can attempt to discover one another
by either establishing a covert channel or by accepting
one. If the malicious user is lucky, she will find a few
other malicious users by such probing and can form a
file-sharing cluster with them. However, if she is un-
lucky, she may probe a TA or reply to connection from
a TA and thus be detected and banished from the P2P
system. A more aggressive malicious node may attempt
to probe more neighbors in hopes of forming a bigger
malicious cluster, but at the same time it runs a higher
risk of being detected by a TA and being banished to
a direct download system. We explore and model the
strategy of a malicious node and the detection proba-
bility in detail in Section 4.
Behavior of Trusted Auditors TAs act as hidden
“sentinels” in the system to prevent excessive malicious
probing, and reduce the rate of malicious cluster forma-
tion. To stay hidden, TAs mimic different roles: regular
or “neutral” nodes, malicious nodes, and seed servers.
In their “neutral” role, TAs mimic the behavior of
P2P peers by implementing the same discovery and
download protocols, exhibit similar download speeds,
arrival and departure rates as the regular clients.
In their “malicious” role, TAs mimic the behavior of
malicious nodes by sending out probes to their neigh-
bors at the same rate as other malicious nodes. TAs
employ two strategies: one strategy involves actively
searching, studying and running the software that ma-
licious users use on TAs. (We believe this to be a rea-
sonable strategy, as the CP can invest significantly more
resources than individual malicious users to obtain such
software.) The second strategy is learning the malicious
probing format and pattern on the fly. This approach is
based on recent work done at UC Berkeley on the Role-
Player system [9]. RolePlayer can quickly learn and
replay various network communication patterns.
Finally, TAs, in collaboration with the Tracker, serve
in the capacity of BitTorrent Seed servers. This guar-
antees that all clients will be able to collect all the file
pieces among their neighbors. To mimic users’ behav-
ior, TAs pretend that they join the system with no file
pieces and gain more pieces over time.
Scalability of TAs The number of trackers and TAs
should scale with the growth of system participants.
As the number of users grows, so will the number of
CP-owned machines. The cost of maintaining such ma-
chines should then scale with the growing revenue. The
system does not require many physical TAs, as each
such machine can participate in a number of simultane-
ous download sessions under virtual IPs. For instance,
if the fraction of TAs in each file-sharing instance is
5%, and each machine participates under 10 virtual IP
addresses, then for a 100,000 simultaneous participants
only 500 physical TA-dedicated machines are necessary.
3.4 Security Analysis
The TP2 architecture was designed to ensure that a
P2P content delivery system could be as equivalent as
possible to a direct download system in terms of security
and trust. This is challenging as in P2P systems users
communicate directly with one another and user IPs
become widely known over time. In practice, even with
an obfuscated P2P client, a malicious user can easily
extract the IPs of peers she is communicated with by
running a simple system command. Wide knowledge of
user IPs makes a P2P system open to both unauthorized
downloads and information ex-filtration attacks which
could lead to formation of user clusters for illegal file-
sharing. Our aim is to develop methods that thwart
both these types of attacks.
In our threat model, we assume that users have strong
identities and use encrypted communication channels to
avoid any leak of information from eavesdropping. In
addition, we assume that any malicious users do not
know one other a priori but rather attempt to find one
other by participating in the system. This is a realistic
assumption given the fact that we are trying to help CPs
replace a direct download system with a P2P one, not to
solve a generic DRM problem. If malicious users know
one other using outside covert channels, then they can
exploit the paid content distribution system regardless
of the download mechanism.
These attacks pose a real and practical threat to a
P2P distribution system. We discuss the two categories
of attacks that are particularly aggravated by a P2P
architecture: content attacks (i.e., unauthorized down-
load of content) and information ex-filtration (i.e., at-
tempts to form file-sharing clusters with known user
IPs). We further classify the latter according to the
logical position of the attacker: Insider Attacks (i.e.,
attacks from system participants) and Outsider Attacks.
3.4.1 Content Attacks
In a P2P setting there is the risk of free downloading
from unauthorized users who try to connect and extract
content from the system. For example, in the BitTor-
rent protocol, if the IP addresses of the file-sharing peers
becomes widely known, an unauthorized user can sim-
ply bypass the tracker, connect to BitTorrent clients
running on those IPs and begin sharing pieces of the
content with them. Another way to obtain content is
to eavesdrop on unencrypted wired or wireless channels.
TP2 effectively prevents such exploitation by enforc-
ing strong authentication and authorization over secure
communication channels. The “Authenticator”, mod-
ule in TP2 is responsible for granting authorization cre-
dentials to users upon their entry into the system over
an SSL-encrypted channel. Furthermore, after being
authenticated, each user is granted a public key. The
TP2 client individually enforces secure communication
between each pair of authorized users using these pub-
lic keys. Because a malicious client has to purchase
content to gain a one-time system path, this creates a
barrier for casual malicious users to enter the system to
either obtain content or just to scavenge for IPs of other
malicious nodes. Her unencrypted and unauthenticated
requests are simply dropped by other participants.
3.4.2 Insider Attacks
Another class of attacks against TP2 can stem from
malicious users who purchase content and thus obtain
the proper authorization to join a file-sharing instance.
As we discussed before, such insider malicious users can
then attempt to discover other malicious users among
the file-sharing clients and form a collaborative network
for future unauthorized sharing. For instance, if five
malicious users with similar interests discover one an-
other in a file-sharing instance, then in the future only
one out of five will need to purchase new content, that
will then be shared with the group. TP2 offers pro-
tection against this abuse by including TAs in the file-
sharing network. The role of the TAs is to detect a
malicious user attempting to scavenge information for
future sharing (e.g.,. There are two ways in which TAs
can detect malicious users: either because the malicious
user contacts the TA and attempts to share unautho-
rized content, or because she allowed a TA (imperson-
ating a malicious user) to contact her and share content
without proper authorization. Upon detection, the user
is “banished” to an isolated direct download system as
described in Section 3.3.
How can we make sure that the identities of TAs
are not exposed to the malicious nodes render-
ing them ineffective? There are two ways in which a
TA can be exposed over time: either by learning the TA
network locations (IP addresses) or by observing their
behavior in the P2P system (i.e when they perform ac-
tive probing or detect a malicious node). To avoid sim-
ple detection of the TAs IP address pool based on their
location, we can buy IP address space from Internet
Service Providers based on their user population [26].
Moreover, for more sophisticated attacks that can learn
even those IPs over time, we can request the TAs IPs to
be given via the same DHCP servers that the ISPs use
for their own users. By doing so, we make the tracing
of the TAs IPs futile since their IPs do not only change
over time but also they are shared by regular Internet
users. Of course, our approach has to include IP address
space inside universities and other large organizations
which can be both from unused or DHCP based IP ad-
dress pool. Obtaining that IP address space for the TAs
does not have to be that extensive just representative.
For example, for 500K simultaneous users, we require
25K (5% TAs). Given that 22 ISP have 75% of the total
users in US [26] and the fact we only use the IP address
space for tunneling packets, it is certainly feasible to
obtain the necessary address pool.
The second way to expose a TA is to learn to identify
its behavior, in particular as it pretends to be malicious
and probes other nodes. However, this is only true if
malicious nodes already have the knowledge of what it
is deemed a “normal” probing rate or they don’t probe
at all (thus exposing the TAs). In both cases, this re-
quires some sort of previous shared knowledge among
malicious nodes about the malicious behavior that they
should exhibit. However even in the extreme case that
malicious users have pre-agreed on a way of probing,
the TAs can mimic such behavior because they are also
receiving a fraction of the malicious probes. Thus, the
TAs can adjust their behavior based on the probes that
they themselves receive (remember that TAs communi-
cate with one another their common knowledge about
the received probing rates).
How can we protect the system from Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks? Since TAs mimic the mali-
cious node probing behavior, the increased rate of prob-
ing may cause TAs to amplify their probing and thus
cause a DoS attack. To avoid this, we use randomized
traffic thresholds for the probing rates received from the
attackers. TAs do not probe beyond those rates. At the
same time, malicious nodes that use DoS run the risk
of being easily detected by the TAs. Thus, a DoS to
scan for other malicious nodes in the P2P, even a short
one, represent a prohibitive cost for the malicious user
since the probability of being detected and shut down
is high.
3.4.3 Outsider Attacks
In this type of attack, an insider participates legit-
imately in a download session and collects the list of
Peer IPs. It attempts to contact these IPs in search of
other malicious nodes from an external IP either dur-
ing or after the download session. Observe that contacts
from outsiders who learn these IPs from a third party
also fall under this type of attack. To address such out-
side scanning we use TAs who are not part of the P2P
network to mimic the behavior of the outside scanning.
Note that for a malicious node inside the P2P network
there is little incentive to answer an outside probe. The
reason for this is that outsiders are less likely to have
content for trading. On the other hand, nodes inside
the P2P are far more likely to have content worth trad-
ing since they have proven that they are actually willing
to buy such content. All things being equal in terms of
scanning, by replying to outside probes malicious insid-
ers run the same risk of detection with uncertain gains.
In practice, there is no incentive for a malicious insider
to respond to outside probes. The TAs prevent a possi-
ble DoS behavior by setting high random thresholds in
the traffic they receive as describe above. .
Furthermore, as we show in our analysis in Section 4,
the mere knowledge that TAs are present in the net-
work causes rational malicious nodes to behave more
cautiously and thus less dangerously towards the CP.
TAs help to set the bar of malicious exploitation high
by detecting malicious users who have purchased con-
tent and thus have gained authorized entry into the sys-
tem. Furthermore, TAs detect users that do not honor
(enforce) the authorization credentials generated by the
authenticator.
4. ANALYSIS
In Section 3 we use strong authentication and autho-
rization to prevent unauthorized downloads - the first
threat discussed in section 3.4. Here, we are going to an-
alyze the second threat - malicious nodes attempting to
find one another and form file-sharing clusters. In these
attacks, malicious nodes participate in the P2P network
like regular users by registering and paying for movie
downloads. If left unchecked, such malicious nodes may
exploit the regular P2P system operation and extract
peer information forming large malicious clusters for fu-
ture illegal file-sharing. These clusters can exploit the
system by purchasing only one copy of a file and shar-
ing it among their members. As we will show with a
simple economic analysis, such illegal sharing could sig-
nificantly decrease the profits of the CP and be a strong
deterrent against the adoption of a P2P approach for
content distribution. In Section 3, we introduced TAs
which limit the formation of large malicious clusters.
In this section, we analyze further the malicious node
strategies and show that even a small number of the
TAs can effectively curb the growth of clusters and suc-
cessfully protect the CP’s profits.
4.1 Economic Impact
We propose a simple economic model to quantify the
impact that malicious nodes have on the CP’s profit.
We assume that the average price of digital content sold
by the CP is S dollars. The CP pays a large part of
that price as royalties $R to the content owner (a movie
studio for example), and retains $D. (D = S − R). In
a direct download system the CP also pays $B for the






































































































Figure 3: CP profit per user download. Distinct combinations of D (profit before bandwidth) and B (bandwidth
cost) capture variations in possible royalties and bandwidth agreements
bandwidth required to serve a file of average size to the
end user. Thus the CP’s profit per movie purchase is,
on average, $(D−B). The market research in [1] shows
that digital movie and audio stores pay roughly 60−70%
of end price (S) in royalties and the cost of bandwidth
amounts to about 20%. Using a store similar to Apple
Itunes as an example, one can purchase standard length
(1GB) digital movies for $10. We assume that D, the
store’s profit before bandwidth cost is $3 to $4 and B,
the cost of bandwidth is roughly $2 per download. We
experiment with these assumptions in this section, but
our results hold for wider ranges of values.
Using a P2P download approach the CP saves on
most of the bandwidth cost and claims a full $D as
profit. Unfortunately, in the presence of malicious users
the CP collects smaller amount of revenue, and thus
smaller profit since the malicious nodes form download-
ing clusters to avoid full content payment. For example,
if two malicious users manage to discover each other
in the P2P system they will form a cluster of size 2.
Then, these users will take turns purchasing files and
sharing them with each other for free instead of buying
them through the CP. For simplicity, we assume that
malicious and non-malicious (or neutral) users desire to
accumulate files at the same rate (e.g. say they down-
load one movie per week), and that their interests are
similar and thus they only need to purchase files at a
fraction of the rate of the neutral users. For instance,
in a cluster of two malicious nodes they each purchase
movies at half the rate of the neutral. More generally,
users who belong to a cluster of size K need to pur-
chase content at a 1K fraction of the rate of the neutral
users to get the same number of files in a given time
interval. This scenario is pessimistic, since we assume
that we lose from all malicious clusters whereas in prac-
tice, only some of the users in the cluster will want any
particular file.
In our model, a single download session consists of
up to Ns nodes that are all assigned to one another by
a tracker. For a popular file, the system runs multi-
ple download sessions of up to Ns nodes each. We as-
sume that a single session contains at mostM malicious
nodes, T TAs andQ neutral nodes withNs = Q+M+T .
In a BitTorrent network a typical value of Ns is around
50 − 60 nodes, thus in our system we will assume a
maximum bound of Ns = 100. Let Mi be the num-
ber of users in the system who are malicious and who




define mi = Mi/(M + Q) and m = M/(M + Q) to
denote the ratio of malicious users to the total number
of malicious and neutral nodes. We can now derive an
amortized profit received by the CP each time a user
accumulates a file as






The first term in Equation 1 is the CP profit from
neutral users who pay a full price and the second term
is from malicious users who pay only a fraction 1i of the
price based on their cluster size i (assuming multiple
downloads). On the other hand, the profit of the CP in
a direct-download system per download is D − B. We
remind the reader once again that we do not attempt
to solve out-of-band sharing that can exist with both
direct and P2P systems. Rather, we are interested in
curbing file-sharing from clusters formed by malicious
exploitation of the P2P distribution system itself.
Using Equation 1, we can produce the CP profit plots
for various values of D and B. Figure 3 depicts CP
profit curves for the P2P and the direct download sys-
tems for various values of m ranging from 0 to 80%.
Each plot picks a different combination of values for D
and B in a reasonable range as describe above to allow
for variations in the cost of royalties and bandwidth.
The x-axis shows the maximum size of a malicious clus-
ter, K. The y-axis shows the average profit claimed by
the CP user download. Each plot contains two horizon-
tal lines: the top one representing a profit of a P2P sys-
tem assuming no malicious nodes and the bottom one
representing profit of a direct download system. The
difference between the two plots is exactly B, the cost
of bandwidth per download. The non-linear curves plot
Equation 1 and represent the profit of a P2P system
with various fractions m of malicious users. The plots
show that as the fraction of malicious nodes and the file-
sharing clusters that they form grow the profits for the
P2P system dwindle. In fact, as the malicious nodes’
fraction approaches 80% and for malicious clusters of
> 20 nodes, the CP collects less than half the profits
of a direct download approach. Even for less aggressive
collections of malicious users, we see that most of the
economic advantage of P2P rapidly evaporates. If the
malware that implements malicious code becomes read-
ily available on the Internet, even the non-savvy users
could easily become malicious. As the fraction of ma-
licious users proliferates and they form larger clusters
with time the profits of the CP quickly erode. For a
P2P system to succeed, it is thus imperative to limit
the effect of the malicious nodes. In the rest of the sec-
tion, we show how even a small fraction of TAs could
maintain the near-optimal P2P level profits for the CP.
4.2 Probing Game
Wemodel the interaction between the malicious nodes
and TAs as a probing game.
Malicious nodes probe and reply to probes from other
malicious nodes in order to form and grow a malicious
cluster. To detect malicious nodes, TAs also pretend to
be malicious. They actively send probes and reply to
probes of malicious nodes. To avoid being detected a
malicious node must not probe all of its neighbors. In-
stead, she chooses a finite strategy that we call a growth
factor (GF) which reflects the minimum cluster size that
she aims to belong to at the end of the download ses-
sion. The malicious node probes and replies to probes
until she discovers at least GF−1 other malicious nodes
which may include a TA pretending to be malicious.
Observe that for GF = 1 malicious nodes will not do
any probing and will act exactly as a neutral node. On
the other hand, if GF > M the malicious nodes are
certain to hit a TA and thus become detected before
they can grow into a cluster of size GF . Thus, GF will
take on some value in the range from 1 to M . In gen-
eral, we make the following set of assumptions about a
download session.
• Malicious nodes remain “active” (i.e. they send
probes and reply to probes) until they reach their
growth factor of GF .
• Each malicious node knows both M and T in a
download session, and based on that picks the most
profitable value of GF . We suggest a good value
for GF later in the section based on a simulation
of multiple games.




























Figure 4: For a single game, probability that a mali-
cious node succeeds in forming a cluster of at least its
growth factor for m=50% (i.e. 50% of users are malicious)
• In the end of the session if a cluster formed dur-
ing the session includes a TA (that pretended to
be malicious) all the malicious nodes in the cluster
are assumed to be “detected” and they are warned
and “banished” by the CP. Observe, that such
nodes still do not know which of the cluster nodes
was trusted and thus cannot assume that they can
share with the nodes they already discovered.
• Both malicious nodes and TAs send probes to ran-
domly chosen neighbors at the same probing rate
per node. TAs send probes at the same rate to
be indistinguishable from malicious nodes. Oth-
erwise, collaborating malicious nodes could easily
pick out TAs in the system.
• Upon receiving probes, neutral nodes simply ig-
nore them. (Having neutral nodes play a role in
detecting malicious nodes can potentially help the
detection of malicious but we leave it as an item
for future work).
Our primary focus is to show that over time, as mali-
cious nodes play multiple games, (i.e. they participate
in many download sessions) most of them become de-
tected and large clusters are unlikely to form. Small
clusters may form, but these have limited economic im-
pact. However, first we show some simulation-based
plots to give some intuition about what happens in a
single download session. We note that these plots use
averaged probabilities collected from a thousand runs
of a simulated game.
Figure 4 shows the probability that a malicious node
succeeds in forming the desired cluster size. Here the
fraction of malicious nodes in the download session m
is fixed at 50% and the number of trusted T is var-
ied over different ratios of M/T . The x-axis shows the
strategy (i.e. growth factor) chosen by the malicious
nodes in the game. The y-axis gives the probability
that a node succeeds in achieving reaching its selected
growth factor. As an example, the scenario ofM/T = 1
(the number of malicious nodes and TAs is the same)
and a target GF = 2, shows that the probability of a
node succeeding in forming a cluster of size 2 is about
25%. Thus there is a 3/4 chance that a node gets de-
tected in such a game. An important observation about
this plot is that all curves are decreasing monotonically.
That means that as the malicious nodes become more
aggressive by picking larger growth factors, they are
also more likely to be detected. Interestingly, even for
the top curve (M/T = 10) and the least aggressive tar-
get of GF = 2, there is only a 77% chance that such a
node succeeds (i.e., there is a 23% chance that it be-
comes detected). So, even in a favorable scenario, the
probability that the node does not become detected in
k independent games is roughly only .77k.
4.3 Analytical Model
We start by analyzing the single session download
model and describing the growth of clusters both in the
first session and after multiple sessions (downloads). To
this end, we present a Markovian model with memo-
ryless states and well-defined transition probabilities.
Using this Markovian model we can fully compute the
stationary probabilities of malicious cluster formulation
(i.e. the probability that a node ends up in a cluster of
size K). Moreover, our model can compute the station-
ary probabilities of the absorbing(final) states starting
from any initial discrete cluster distribution. This en-
ables us to compute the stationary distribution across
multiple downloads by recursively applying our analysis
starting with singleton malicious clusters and using the
resulting cluster distribution as a starting distribution
for the next session.
To simplify our presentation, we start by modeling
a download session with a M and T malicious nodes
and TAs respectively. Moreover, we set the value of
the growth factor to be 2, (GF = 2). A state in such
a download session is fully captured by the tuple <
A,F > where A is the number of active malicious nodes
(that are still probing) and F the number of detected
(found) nodes. The number of clusters of size two at
a given state is simply the remaining nodes: M−F−A2 .
The valid transitions from < A,F > are to < A−2, F >
(two active malicious nodes form a cluster) and to <
A−1, F +1 > (one active node becomes detected). Re-
call that all active malicious nodes and TAs probe at the
same rate, and thus the probability that the next probe
is from a malicious node is AA+T and is
T
A+T that it is
from a TA. The probability of a cluster being formed
is simply the probability that the next probe is sent by
an active malicious node or that it is sent to one other
active malicious node. (Recall that the probabilities do
not need to account for probes being sent to inactive
malicious or neutral nodes as such nodes simply ignore
the probes.) We thus have the following transition prob-





T +A− 1 .
A node is detected when a malicious node sends a
probe to a TA or when a TA sends a probe to a malicious









The starting state is< M, 0 > and the terminal states
are of the form < 0, F > where no active nodes are left.
The process is clearly Markovian as transition probabil-
ities are uniquely determined by the current state, and
the probabilities add up to 1.
We can generalize this models to the case with GF >
2. Here the state space becomes< A1, . . . , A2·GF−2, F >,
where Ai is the number of clusters of size i. Note, that
for a target size GF it is possible to have clusters of
size up to 2 ·GF − 2, because two active clusters of size
GF − 1 could join together. Let L =
GF−1∑
k=1
k ·Ak be the
number of active nodes (i.e. all malicious nodes in clus-
ters of size < GF ). We can then proceed similarly to
the case GF = 2 and compute the non-zero transition
probabilities in three cases.
The first case is that a cluster of size i becomes de-
tected, which occurs when a malicious node belonging
to a cluster of size i probes a TA or a TA probes a











The second case is when two clusters of size i and j,
with i < GF and j < GF join to form a cluster of size















· i · (Ai − 1)
T + L− i
These are the only allowable and valid transitions. The
starting state is S =< M, 0, . . . , 0 > means that all
nodes are singletons (i.e belong to clusters of size 1 ).
Moreover, all terminal states are of the form:
< 0, . . . , 0, AGF . . . , A(2·GF−2), F >
There are no clusters of size less thatGF as all malicious
nodes have either been detected or have formed clusters
of size equal or more than GF .





























Malicious Cluster Size CDF for GF=3, m=50%
M/T=10 M/T=5 M/T=1 M/T=0.5




























Malicious Cluster Size CDF for GF=2, m=50%
M/T=10 M/T=5 M/T=1 M/T=0.5
Figure 5: Cumulative probability of forming clusters for growth factor GF = 2 and GF = 3 for multiple games. Notice
that both plots look similar and that for M/T = 10, GF = 2 results in slightly larger cluster sizes.
Once we construct the transition probabilities matrix
P we can easily compute the probability of specific ter-
minal states by exponentiation P (n) for some n > 1 at
which the terminal probabilities converge. PS,j(n) gives
the probability that a particular terminal state j occurs.
(Note also that n is bounded by M ∗ (GF − 1) as each
malicious node transitions at most GF − 1 times).
4.4 Multiple Games (Downloads)
For multiple downloads, we have to consider that af-
ter the first download session, there are some unde-
tected clusters formed. Furthermore, we assume that
it is to the benefit of the malicious nodes to have only
one representative from each cluster participate in the
next download session since they share content out-of-
band.(this way only one of them pays) For example, as-
suming a closed system (no new arrivals), if in the first
download we had M malicious participants and all of
them managed to form clusters of size 2 , in the second
download onlyM/2 of them will participate. Therefore,
after the first game, we will only have a fraction of the
malicious nodes that participated in the first download
either because they managed to form clusters or because
they got detected by TAs. In addition, we assume that
these malicious participants are acting on behalf of the
formed clusters and thus are still aiming for the same
growth factor GF .
The Markovian approach we presented in the previ-
ous section can still be applied but with some modifica-
tions: we have to recompute the transition probabilities
because for each games we start with a different num-
ber of malicious nodes. We can compute the number of
malicious nodes between games by taking into consid-
eration the following parameters: formed clusters from
previous game (both detected and undetected), arrival
of new malicious singletons and departures of malicious
nodes. Formed undetected clusters are the clusters who
still contain nodes that have not been detected in pre-
vious downloads. In addition, we assume that we have
Ar arrivals of malicious singletons and De departures of
malicious nodes that can be either previously detected
or undetected. For simplicity, we chose Ar = De and
we call the new quantity “renewal rate”. Throughout
our analysis, we used a renewal rate of 5% but similar
results hold for renewal rats of 1% to 10%.
Thus, based on the information on the clusters formed
and detected from the previous game and the renewal
rate, we compute the new number of malicious nodes
that will participate in the next download. We then
generate the transition probability matrix and we start
from state S =< Mn, 0, . . . , 0 > where Mn is the num-
ber of computed malicious nodes. Using the resulting
steady-state probabilities and the cluster distribution
prior to the download, we compute the resulting joint
distribution assuming that only one node from the un-
detected clusters participated in the download. For ex-
ample, assuming that we have a representative of cluster
of size K with F detected participating in a download
with growth factor GF = 2 and initial cluster distribu-
tion Pi, then the resulting transitions are to a cluster
of size K + i with F detected with probability Ps · Pi
and a cluster of size K with 1 detected with probability
Pd, where Ps and Pd are the probabilities of actually
forming the cluster or being detected, respectively.
Although, maintaining state for all formed clusters
across multiple downloads appears to be large, in prac-
tice it is not. We start from a small initial set of mali-
cious singletons that form clusters which grow by merg-
ing with each other, leading to rapidly declining num-
ber of non detected clusters. Moreover, the malicious to
TAs M/T is also decreasing, leading to more detected
malicious nodes. Therefore, although there are in prin-
cipal a large number of possible cluster sizes that can be
formed, in practice the actual number of formed clusters
decreases fast over multiple downloads.
4.4.1 Simulations
To verify our analytical model and to avoid the com-



















































CP Profit with Bandwidth Cost B=2
P2P, m=0%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=20%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=40%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=60%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=80%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=90%
Direct Download
Figure 6: Comparison of CP profits between a protected and an unprotected system for bandwidth cost of 2. On the
left we have a system without TAs and on the right a system with a ratio of TAs to malicious users being 10. Clearly,
the protected system yields more profits than the unprotected system for the same fraction of malicious nodes which
are very close to the ones produced by a P2P system with 0% of malicious nodes.
putational complexity involved in computing joint prob-
abilities cluster sizes formed over multiple downloads of
a large user population, we generated simulations of
single and multiple download sessions. The results of
our simulations fully agree with the ones obtained us-
ing the analytical model for growth factors GF = 2 and
GF = 3. For larger values of GF , and to show that such
choice of GF is not beneficial for the malicious nodes
over multiple downloads, we relied on the simulations.
We used MatLab to simulate the overall behavior of
a BitTorrent-like P2P system with neutral, malicious
and trusted nodes. We varied the overall system size,
ranging from 105 to 107 participants. Our results re-
main consistent for all sizes. The plots presented in
this paper are obtained using a population of 2 · 106
nodes. Our aim was to examine the performance lim-
its of our system under diverse operating conditions by
varying both the fraction of the malicious nodesM and
their relative ratio to the TAs M/T . In addition, we
wanted to find which growth factor is more beneficial
for the malicious nodes across multiple downloads. We
picked 30 downloads as the number we use for the mul-
tiple plots, because at 30 downloads we have detected
the overwhelming majority of the formed clusters for
all M/T ratios we consider. In addition, after 30 down-
loads, we notice that new clusters are formed almost
exclusively by the new malicious arrivals and thus we
consider the distribution to be stable.
4.4.2 Results
We now describe our concluding results about the
system. We first study the affect of the parameter GF .
In Figure 5, we present results from multiple downloads
and for growth factors GF = 2 and GF = 3. The de-
picted results indicate that there is very little difference
in the malicious cluster size distribution (CDF) when
comparing GF = 2 and GF = 3 with the first having
slightly better results. Therefore, the malicious users
should select GF = 2 as their growth factor if they
want to optimize their probability of being in a larger
cluster over multiple downloads.
The main result of the system with TAs is a high
detection rate of the malicious nodes. In fact, in our
simulation even starting with m = 60% of malicious
nodes and M/T = 10 with GF = 2 after the multi-
game simulation reaches steady state we observed that
more than 99% of the malicious nodes in the system
have been “detected”. 80% of the malicious nodes failed
to form clusters of even a small size prior to detection.
4.4.3 Profits
CPs can leverage the high detection rate of TP2 to
recognize higher profits. The actual profit model will
depend on the policy that the CP uses to deal with mis-
behaving nodes. We look at aggressive and conservative
policies, each of which result in higher profits than in a
unprotected system.
With the conservative policy, the CP warns the de-
tected malicious users but leaves them in the P2P sys-
tem. The CP threatens a fine or court action for illegal
activity and forces them to re-download a new software
client. If the CP believes that almost all such users will
behave neutrally then it continues to make $D in profit
from these users. Equation 2 presents the amortized
profit per download under this policy.








This is an extension of equation 1 with the additional
term: −B · TM+Q that accounts for the bandwidth used
by the TAs normalized by the total number of malicious
and neutral users in the system. Figure 6 compares
the profits of an unprotected system with that of TP2
based on a multi-game simulation (with the parameters
as describe above) when it reaches steady state. TP2
shows much higher profits. For instance with m = 60%,
M/T = 10, D = 4 and B = 2 the profit is 122% higher
for TP2. Observe, that if instead the CP decides to
move the detected nodes to a direct download system
and charge them a penalty of their bandwidth cost the
equation 2 also describes the resulting profit. In this
situation the CP still makes $D from each download.
With an aggressive policy the CP does not trust the
detected users to behave neutrally after a warning. The
CP moves the detected users to a direct download sys-
tem but does not charge them a bandwidth penalty.
These users are no longer a threat but the CP now loses
$B of bandwidth cost for their downloads. Equation 3
describes the profit based on this policy where the CP
looses $B on m1 fraction of nodes - the singleton mali-









Figure 3 shows the steady state profit based on such
a policy. Even with this conservative assumption in
the case of m = 60%, M/T = 10, D = 4 and B = 2
the steady state profit is 62% greater even with very
few TAs. For a very high initial value of m = 90%,
the profit curve under this policy overlaps with direct
download. The CP can improve the profit by mov-
ing detected nodes only temporarily until they can gain
higher reputation. We leave this item for future study.






















CP Profit with Bandwidth Cost=2
P2P, M=0%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , M=20%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , M=40%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , M=60%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , M=80%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , M=90%
Direct Download
Figure 7: CP profits in steady state based on a aggres-
sive policy, with M/T = 10
5. IMPLEMENTATION&PERFORMANCE
We implemented an TP2 prototype by adding mod-
ifications to the existing BitTorrent client and Tracker
(version 3.9.1) written in Python. Our modest modifi-
cations included adding secure channel communication
using RC4 encryption, assignment of trusted auditors
by the Tracker, and the distribution of credentials by
the tracker to the peers.
Due to space constraints, we briefly discuss two sim-
ple experiments we conducted using PlanetLab [22] to
compare the download speed of TP2 clients compared to
BitTorrent clients on a set of geographically distributed
machines given the overhead of secure communication
and credentials distribution and verification in TP2.
Most machines used were equipped with 3GHz proces-
sors and ran the Linux 2.6.12 kernel.
For our first test, we deployed 41 BitTorrent clients
randomly distributed in the continental US. A node was
designated as the Seed client and initialized it with a
512MB movie file. To stress our system, we stored no
parts of the file on the rest of the clients before the
test. We ran the Tracker process on a machine outside
of PlanetLab, a blade server with 3.06GHz processors,
running a Linux 2.6.11 kernel, and a 10Mbit/sec upload
bandwidth link. We ran the test both with the unmod-
ified BitTorrent code and with TP2. The BitTorrent
download times were only 0.8% faster on average, show-
ing that TP2 adds negligible performance overhead.
For our second test, we performed a similar exper-
iment as the first test but using a more dynamic sce-
nario where peers join the download system at staggered
times. We began with one Seed and 76 clients. The 76
clients joined the system at 2 minute intervals. By the
time the later peers start, more clients in the system
already have partial data sets. Therefore, newer clients
have more sources to download the data from and thus
their download times are generally faster. For this test,
TP2 clients on average slightly outperformed BitTor-
rent by about 0.5%. This was due to the fact that the
TP2 nodes contact the Tracker more frequently and re-
ceive new connection assignments at a faster rate at
startup. As a result, initially they have slightly more
choices for selecting faster sources.
6. CONCLUSIONS
TP2 is the first system that can be layered on top
of existing P2P systems to enable content providers to
leverage the download capabilities of a P2P system, and
yet elevate their trust and content control to levels sim-
ilar to that provided by a direct download system. Our
approach provides strong authentication and introduces
a novel notion of trusted auditors into a P2P system.
Strong authentication ensures that the P2P system it-
self cannot be directly used for free file sharing. Trusted
auditors appear as regular P2P nodes, but actively and
passively detect malicious participants in the system to
prevent scavenging of information that could be used
to identify other participants for forming out-of-band
free file sharing clusters. Just like in a direct-download
system, TP2 does not prevent a user who legally down-
loads content from sharing it out-of-band, but it does
prevent the system itself from being exploited in any
way to facilitate out-of-band free file sharing.
We have analyzed TP2 by modeling it as a game be-
tween malicious users who try to form free file sharing
clusters and trusted auditors who curb the growth of
such clusters. We have combined this analysis with a
simple economic model to quantify the cost-effectiveness
of our approach in the presence of malicious users. Our
analysis shows that even when 60% of the participants
in a system are malicious users, our system can detect
99% of malicious users and prevent them from form-
ing large clusters, thereby providing strong protection
of the P2P system against unauthorized file sharing.
For most configurations, our analysis shows that TP2
yields profits that are between 62 and 122% higher than
a direct download system based on conservative profit
and bandwidth cost models. We demonstrate that TP2
can be implemented on top of BitTorrent with modest
modifications, and provides its content protection and
economic benefits with negligible performance overhead
compared to vanilla BitTorrent. We believe that our
analysis and system provides a strong economic moti-
vation for content providers to adopt regular P2P sys-
tem enhanced with security guarantees for their content
delivery. We hope that TP2 can serve as a strong foun-
dation for creating practical P2P systems that can be
used for paid content distribution.
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